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How the Coronavirus Crisis
Challenges International
Investment (Customary) Law
Rules: Which Role for the
Necessity Defense?
Federica Cristani ∗
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic is affecting every aspect of our daily life;
what’s more, it is affecting and will affect for some years from now the
global economy. The present working paper offers a reflection on how
State’s restrictive trade measures are affecting foreign investors’ rights.
The study investigates how the exceptional circumstances of the
COVID-19 pandemic can justify State’s measures affecting foreign
investors’ rights and whether they can be legally justified under the
customary international rule of the necessity defense.
The first part of the paper will analyze the requirements of the
states of necessity, as codified in article 25 of the ILC Draft Article.
The second part of the paper will apply the requirements of the
customary law rule of the necessity defense to the COVID-19 pandemic,
taken into account national measures that have been taken by States
during this period; it will be questioned whether the global and
exceptional circumstances of the spread of COVID-19 will influence
(and maybe change) the way we interpret and apply this customary
rule.
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I. The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on
international investment policies: an introductory
overview
We are in the midst of the one of the “greatest economic, financial
and social shock[s] of the 21st century”—as the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) Secretary
General, Angel Gurría has labelled the COVID-19 health crisis. 1 The
COVID-19 pandemic 2 (“Pandemic”) is affecting every aspect of our
daily lives. What’s more, it is affecting, and will likely affect, the global

1.

OECD Secretary-General: Coronavirus ‘War’ Demands Joint Action,
OECD (Mar. 21, 2020), http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/oecd-secretarygeneral-coronavirus-war-demands-joint-action.htm
[https://perma.cc/3C7L-4NLA].

2.

The World Health Organization [hereinafter WHO] defined the COVID19 outbreak as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on
January 30, 2020 and, on March 11, 2020, declared it a pandemic. See the
WHO, Statement on the Second Meeting of the International Health
Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee Regarding the Outbreak of
Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-01-2020-statement-on-thesecond-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergencycommittee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov)
[https://perma.cc/BN9E-TSMY]; WHO Director-General’s Opening
Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
(Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-directorgeneral-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march2020 [https://perma.cc/S53F-HS2G]; see generally Armin von Bogdandy
& Pedro Villarreal, International Law on Pandemic Response: A First
Stocktaking in Light of the Coronavirus Crisis, in MPIL RSCH, SERIES
(Raffaela Kunz ed.) (forthcoming); Philippe Sands, COVID-19
Symposium: COVID-19 and International Law, OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 30,
2020),
http://opiniojuris.org/2020/03/30/symposium-covid-19-andinternational-law [https://perma.cc/L3KZ-TP42]
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economy for years after, including international investment flows. 3
Actually, financial and economic crises have always affected investment
policies worldwide. 4 The 2008–2009 financial and economic crisis led to
unemployment, debt, low growth, and poor access to financing across
Europe. 5 This resulted inter alia in reduced foreign direct investment
(“FDI”) in the EU. 6 Foreign investors worldwide were prudent in
making their investment decisions as the risk of facing insolvency was
very high. 7 Indeed, when a state is coping with an economic crisis, its
domestic legislation undergoes constant change. 8 In such circumstances
of legal uncertainty, foreign investors find it difficult to make adequate
business decisions, which negatively influences FDI inflows in the
country. 9
This is even more true when we consider the current COVID-19
crisis:
the
Pandemic
is
something
new, 10
and
this
health/economic/social crisis is incomparable in our modern history.11
Most countries have declared national state of emergencies and are
adopting restrictive measures (e.g. social distancing, quarantines and
even state control of certain strategic companies) on the ground of
exceptional circumstances. 12 Some countries have established export
controls over certain medical products (e.g. medical ventilators, certain
drugs, personal protective equipment) in the form of temporary export
3.

Adnan Seric & Jostein Hauge, Foreign Direct Investments Could
Contract by 40% This Year, Hitting Developing Countries Hardest,
WORLD ECON. F. (June 2, 2020),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/06/coronavirus-covid19economics-fdi-investment-united-nations/ [https://perma.cc/VMJ3VSTC].

4.

See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment
Prospects Survey 2010–2012, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2010/4 (Aug. 31,
2010).

5.

Id. at 1.

6.

Id.

7.

See id. at 5.

8.

See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Assessing the Impact of
the Current Financial and Economic Crisis on Global FDI Flows, 41–46,
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/3 (Apr. 2009).

9.

See id. at 44–45.

10.

See OECD Secretary-General: Coronavirus ‘War’ Demands Joint Action,
supra note 1.

11.

Id.

12.

Sándor Lénárd, The COVID-19 and the ‘State of Necessity’, MANDINER
(Apr. 13, 2020),
https://precedens.mandiner.hu/cikk/20200413_the_covid_19_and_the
_state_of_necessity [https://perma.cc/29MG-FHEW] (interviewing
Federica Cristani).
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bans or the addition of licensing/authorisation requirements. 13 Other
countries, concerned with food security, have introduced export
restrictions over specific agricultural products. 14 Most countries are
introducing screening mechanisms on foreign investment, with the aim
to safeguard national businesses from foreign hostile takeovers. 15 Such
measures have a great impact on international trade and investment. 16
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(“UNCTAD”) latest estimates project a dramatic 30–50% drop in FDI
flows worldwide for 2021, with the hardest-hit sector being
Manufacturing. 17
Accordingly, states around the world are adopting investmentrelated policies and regulations that aim to stimulate foreign
investment and conversely, reinforce their own national economies. 18
Overall, this approach can be detrimental to the rights of foreign
investors that are guaranteed by international investment treaties and
customary law rules.
This Article investigates how states’ new trade and investment
regulatory measures are affecting and will likely affect foreign investors’
rights, and to what extent the exceptional circumstances of the
Pandemic can justify such measures under international investment
law.
A. States’ regulatory measures affecting foreign investors during the
pandemic

The UNCTAD is constantly monitoring the national regulatory
measures countries around the world are adopting to address the
13.

COVID-19: Measures Affecting Trade in Goods, WORLD TRADE ORG.
(Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trade_related_goods
_measure_e.htm [https://perma.cc/K44N-YY2A].

14.

See Agency Chiefs Issue Joint Call to Keep Food Trade Flowing in
Response to COVID-19, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/igo_26mar20_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/C8R7-PYC3], for the joint statement by the DirectorsGeneral of the Food and Agriculture Organization, the WHO and the
WTO, who remarked that “[u]ncertainty about food availability can spark
a wave of [additional] export restrictions, creating a shortage on the global
market.”

15.

See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment
Report 2020, 92, UNCTAD/WIR/2020 (June 2020).

16.

Id. at 88.

17.

Id. at 5–7.

18.

See Press Release, World Trade Org., Trade Set to Plunge as COVID-19
Pandemic Upends Global Economy (Apr. 8, 2020), for a general overview
of trade measures that states are adopting to face the COVID-19
pandemic crisis.
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Pandemic. 19 These measures are diverse in nature and scope, ranging
from measures supporting investors and domestic economies in general,
to policies aimed at protecting critical domestic infrastructure and
industries, particularly in the health sector. 20 For the most part, they
affect future FDI inflows and respond to two main concerns: 1) offering
incentives to prospective foreign investors (trying to face the
forthcoming FDI inflow breakdown); and 2) safeguarding national
critical infrastructures (by applying screening mechanisms). 21
Among the different regional realities around the world, the
European Union (“EU”) is quite interesting because it enjoys exclusive
competence over international trade matters. 22 This covers trade in
goods and services, commercial aspects of intellectual property, and—
since the 2009 Lisbon Treaty—FDI. 23 However, despite several
interventions by EU institutions on FDI policies, a regional uniform
approach is still lacking on foreign investment policies and thus many
uncertainties remain. 24 This lack of uniformity becomes even more
evident in times of economic crises, where states tend to adopt economic
and financial decisions at the national level without (or with very little)
coordination at the regional level (with the EU). 25 Indeed, some EU
member states have autonomously adopted national measures
regarding FDI; for example, France expanded its foreign investment
screening regime by broadening the relevant sectoral scope. 26 Italy
increased the scope of disclosure requirements and extended the
timeframe for review procedures, while also introducing the so-called
golden power mechanism to protect strategic national businesses from
19.

See Investment Policy Monitor, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV.,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-monitor
[https://perma.cc/75U9-3NRA].

20.

U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Investment Policy Monitor,
1 (Apr. 2020).

21.

See id.

22.

See generally Stephen Woolcock, Directorate-General for External
Policies, The EU Approach to International Investment Policy After the
Lisbon Treaty, EXPO/B/INTA/FWC/2009-01/Lot7/07-08-09 (Oct.
2010).

23.

See id. at 6.

24.

See id. at 14–15.

25.

See id. at 10.

26.

France — Government Extends FDI Screening Regime as a Response to
the COVID-19 Pandemics, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV.: INV.
POLICY MONITOR (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policymonitor/measures/3517/france-the-government-extends-fdi-screeningregime-as-a-response-to-the-covid-19-pandemics [https://perma.cc/22X2NU4U].
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foreign hostile takeovers. 27 Spain suspended the liberalization of the
foreign investment regime in its territory with regard to some critical
areas, such as infrastructure, technologies and media. 28 Most countries
are adopting measures to support domestic industries through state
subsidies; for example, Germany is considering measures to protect its
national industrial sector, 29 and the Italian deputy economic minister
stressed that Italy will not “become someone’s shopping territory.” 30
Simultaneously, the EU is adopting supporting measures. 31 Among
those measures is an allowance for member states to adopt maximum
flexibility when applying EU rules on state aid measures—to support
national businesses and workers—and on public finances and fiscal
policies, with a view to accommodate exceptional national spending. 32
27.

See Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic, the Government Strengthens its
Special Powers in Strategic Sectors, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV.:
INV. POLICY MONITOR (Apr. 6, 2020),
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policymonitor/measures/3506/italy-amid-the-covid-19-pandemic-thegovernment-strengthens-its-special-powers-in-strategic-sectors
[https://perma.cc/SFN3-6FRN]; see also Francesca Torricelli & Pietro
Missanelli, Italian Law: Corporate Transparency and ‘Golden Power’
Provisions in Emergency Legislation for Coronavirus Disease 2019,
NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 23, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/italian-law-corporatetransparency-and-golden-power-provisions-emergency-legislation
[https://perma.cc/LLQ6-QA35].

28.

U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Investment Policy
Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic, 8 (May 2020).

29.

See Responses to COVID-19 by Tightening FDI Screening, U.N. CONF.
TRADE & DEV.: INV. POLICY MONITOR (May 20, 2020),
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policymonitor/measures/3526/germany-responses-to-covid-19-by-tighteningfdi-screening [https://perma.cc/Y3Q3-XUKR].

ON

30.

Giuseppe Fonte, Italy to Defend ‘Strategic Companies’ from Foreign
Takeovers, REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-m-a-government/italy-todefend-strategic-companies-from-foreign-takeovers-idUSKBN21512L
[https://perma.cc/L6CU-HQLC].

31.

See A European Roadmap to Lifting Coronavirus Containment
Measures, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-traveleu/health/coronavirus-response/european-roadmap-lifting-coronaviruscontainment-measures_en [https://perma.cc/6AN3-QB4Q].

32.

See COVID-19 Coronavirus Pandemic, COUNCIL OF THE EUR. UNION,
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/covid-19-coronavirusoutbreak-and-the-eu-s-response [https://perma.cc/P8KT-HEHA]; see
also Guidance on Customs Issues Related to the COVID-19 Emergency,
EUR. COMM’N (Apr. 27, 2020),
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/covid-19-taxudresponse/guidance-customs-issues-related-covid-19-
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In the field of FDI, it is worth recalling the recent guidelines
published by the European Commission (“Commission”) directing
member states on how to deal with FDI and, in particular, on how to
apply the 2019 FDI Screening Regulation during the Pandemic. 33
On March 19, 2019, the EU adopted Regulation 2019/452 (“FDI
Screening Regulation”), which established a framework for the
screening of foreign direct investments into the EU from non-EU
countries. 34 Such a framework aims to establish a cooperation
mechanism where member states and the Commission can exchange
information regarding the screening of FDI on the grounds of security
and public order. 35 The Regulation, as specified in the 2017 Background
Communication of the Commission, should “[w]elcom[e] foreign direct
investment while protecting essential interests” of member states and
the EU. 36 The Regulation took effec October 11, 2020. 37 Previously, on
March 25, 2020, the Commission drafted guidelines on how to use the
FDI screening mechanism in a time of public health crisis. 38
As of the date of this writing, national foreign direct investment
screening mechanisms are in place in 14 member states (including, Italy,
Spain, and France). 39 The Commission stated that,
“Today more than ever, the EU’s openness to foreign investment
needs to be balanced by appropriate screening tools. In the
context of the COVID-19 emergency, there could be an increased
risk of attempts to acquire healthcare capacities . . . or related
industries such as research establishments (for instance
developing vaccines) via foreign direct investment. . . . At present,
the responsibility for screening FDI rests with Member States.
emergency_en#heading_9 [https://perma.cc/VCJ4-DLFL], for a list of
exceptional measures taken by the customs authorities of member states
during the COVID-19 crisis.
33.

See Regulation 2019/452, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 19 March 2019 Establishing a Framework for the Screening of Foreign
Direct Investments into the Union, 2019 O.J. (L 79) 1, 1.

34.

Id.

35.

Id. at 2.

36.

Welcoming Foreign Direct Investment While Protecting Essential
Interests, at 1, COM (2017) 494 final (Sept. 9, 2017).

37.

Regulation 2019/452, supra note 33, at 12.

38.

See Guidance to the Member States Concerning Foreign Direct
Investment and Free Movement of Capital from Third Countries, and the
Protection of Europe’s Strategic Assets, Ahead of the Application of
Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (FDI Screening Regulation), at 1, COM (2020)
1981 final (Mar. 25, 2020) [hereinafter Guidance to the Member States].

39.

Id. at 2, Annex.
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FDI screening should take into account the impact on the
European Union as a whole, in particular with a view to ensuring
the continued critical capacity of EU industry, going well beyond
the healthcare sector.” 40

The Commission further specified, “investments that do not
constitute FDI, i.e. portfolio investments, may be screened by the
Member States in compliance with the Treaty provisions on free
movement of capital.” 41 Moreover, “[b]esides investment screening,
Member States may retain special rights in certain undertakings
(“golden shares”). . . . Like other restrictions to capital movements,
they must be necessary and proportionate to achieve a legitimate public
policy objective.” 42 Accordingly, the Commission advised member
states not only on FDI (which are under the exclusive competence of
the EU), but also on portfolio investment and golden shares, whose
regulations remain under the competence of the member states, in
compliance with the EU rules of the internal market. 43 And in this
respect, the Commission made it clear that “[g]rounds of public policy,
public security and public health can be relied on [for restrictions for
capital movements] if there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat
to a fundamental interest of society” 44 and that “[t]he permissible
grounds of justification may also be interpreted more broadly.” 45
Regarding the consequences of such measures to foreign investors
in the EU, it is useful to make some distinctions 1) between foreign
investors already present in host states that are or will be affected by
national measures (e.g. nationalizations of foreign investment during
the period of emergency or state aid measures addressed to national
businesses) and incoming foreign investors; and 2) with regard to
incoming foreign investors, as already seen, the measures of the host
state likely to affect them can be divided between incentives and
restrictions following screening mechanisms.
Since all such measures are very new (and other measures will likely
be adopted), it is too early to predict exactly how they will be applied
and the exact economic consequences they will produce. However, we
40.

Id. at 1.

41.

Id. at 2, Annex.

42.

Id.

43.

Axel Schulz, Genevra Forwood, Orion Berg, & Matthias Vangenechten,
COVID-19 – Commission Issues Guidelines to Protect European Critical
Assets from Foreign Investment, WHITE & CASE (Apr. 1, 2020)
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/covid-19-commissionissues-guidelines-protect-european-critical-assets-foreign
[https://perma.cc/ET8K-F4TR].

44.

Guidance to the Member States, supra note 38, at 3, Annex.

45.

Id.
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might elaborate on some questions that states should address to avoid
international responsibility for breaching international obligations
under international investment law. 46 In particular, foreign investors
may likely question the breach of international investment obligations
by host states, claiming that the national measures constitute a breach
of non-discrimination and fair and equitable treatment, or amount to
indirect expropriation. 47 For example, to support the national
healthcare systems, Spain 48 and Ireland 49 have decided to temporarily
nationalize private hospitals; Italy has also adopted several emergency
measures including, among others, 50 the temporary or permanent
requisition of medical devices from private businesses. 51
In this respect, it is crucial to understand to what extent the
exceptional circumstances of the Pandemic can justify states’ measures
46.

See generally Pieter Bekker, International Law in Times of Crisis:
COVID-19 and Foreign Investments, LEXOLOGY (May 4, 2020),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c8c46035-4e4f-4f9f8f16-66b23b5942a0 [https://perma.cc/BZ4E-SXZ3].

47.

See Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Sarah Brewin, & Nyaguthii
Maina, Protecting Against Investor–State Claims Amidst COVID-19: A
Call to Action for Governments, IISD (Apr. 14, 2020),
https://www.iisd.org/articles/protecting-against-investor-state-claimsamidst-covid-19-call-action-governments [https://perma.cc/EJY4LFPV]; Michael Ostrove, Kate Brown de Vejar, & Ben Sanderson,
COVID-19 — a Legitimate Basis for Investment Claims?, DLA PIPER –
PUBLICATIONS (Apr. 16, 2020),
https://www.dlapiper.com/it/italy/insights/publications/2020/04/covid
-19-a-legitimate-basis-for-investment-claims [https://perma.cc/PYP3VQ8E].

48.

Adam Payne, Spain has Nationalized all of its Private Hospitals as the
Country Goes into Coronavirus Lockdown, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 16,
2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-spain-nationalisesprivate-hospitals-emergency-covid-19-lockdown-2020-3?IR=T
[https://perma.cc/36ZG-JA7S].

49.

Órla Ryan, Private Hospitals will be Made Public for Duration of
JOURNAL
(Mar.
24,
2020),
Coronavirus
Pandemic,
THE
https://www.thejournal.ie/private-hospitals-ireland-coronavirus5056334-Mar2020/ [https://perma.cc/279L-F589]

50.

Massimo Benedetteli, Caterina Coroneo, & Nicolò Minella, Could COVID19 Emergency Measures Give Rise to Investment Claims? First
Reflections from Italy, GLOBAL ARBITRATION REV. (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1222354/could-covid-19emergency-measures-give-rise-to-investment-claims-first-reflections-fromitaly [https://perma.cc/PS7A-ZYR9].

51.

Carloandrea Meacci, Law Decree No 18 of 17 March 2020 - Cura Italia
Decree, ASHURST – NEWS & INSIGHTS (March 30, 2020),
https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-insights/legal-updates/lawdecree-no-18-of-17-march-2020---cura-italia-decree/
[https://perma.cc/7PVZ-VFJP]; see also Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra
note 47.
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affecting foreign investors’ rights. The following Section II illustrates
the tools international investment law offers to states for measures
adopted under exceptional circumstances and how states can apply
these measures during the Pandemic.

II. Justifications for States’ exceptional measures
affecting foreign investors’ rights under
international (investment) law
Foreign investors may rightly question a breach of international
investment obligations by host states, claiming that the national trade
and investment-related measures adopted to cope with the Pandemic
constitute a breach of international obligations that are guaranteed in
the relevant international investment agreements [“IIAs”].52
Accordingly, foreign investors may bring host states before
international investment arbitral tribunals — as provided for in IIAs
— and ask for reparation. 53 Indeed, some investment arbitration cases
have already started. 54 According to an open letter sent in June 2020
by the Seattle to Brussels Network to national governments and signed
by 630 organizations, “from 1 March until 25 May 2020 when most
governments were in the midst of the Pandemic, 12 new [investor-state
dispute settlement] cases were filed . . . . Most of those were against
Latin American countries . . . : Colombia (3 cases), Peru (2), Panama
(1), Mexico (1), Dominican Republic (1), Norway (1), Croatia (1),
Serbia (1), Romania (1).” 55

52.

See generally Kevin O’Gorman et al., Investor-State Claims in the Era of
the COVID-19 Pandemic, 14 NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT INT’L ARB.
REP. 17 (Jun. 2020).

53.

Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 47. Most IIAs provide for investorstate dispute settlement mechanisms, according to which the foreign
investor may bring the host state before an independent and international
arbitral. Id.

54.

See generally Maxi Scherer et al., International Arbitration and the
COVID-19 Revolution (Part 2 of 2), WOLTERS KLUWER (Oct. 15, 2020),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/10/15/internationalarbitration-and-the-covid-19-revolution-part-2-of-2/
[https://perma.cc/L88F-N2T3].

55.

Open Letter to Governments on ISDS and COVID-19, SEATTLE TO
BRUSSELS NETWORK (June 2020), http://s2bnetwork.org/sign-the-penletter-to-governments-on-isds-and-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/5RAB9C8S]; see also BRETTON WOODS PROJECT, Fears of lawsuits at World
Bank’s tribunal constrain efforts to fight pandemic, THE BRETTON
WOODS OBSERVER (July 16, 2020),
https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2020/07/fears-of-lawsuits-atworld-banks-tribunal-constrain-efforts-to-fight-pandemic/
[https://perma.cc/KJD7-XHY3].
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International investment law gives host states two kinds of defenses
in case of investment claims: 56 1) exceptions envisaged by the applicable
Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) or IIA giving a safeguard to
regulations that were created for, among other reasons, the
maintenance of public order or the protection public health (called nonprecluded measure clauses); 57 and 2) defenses under customary
international law-most notably, the state of necessity and force
majeure, as codified by the International Law Commission in the
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
[“ILC Articles”]. 58
Moreover, it has also been proposed (regarding measures taken
during the 2008-2009 financial and economic crisis) that treaty
obligations under IIAs might be temporarily suspended during a grave
crisis, as a consequence of Article 62 of Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, according to which a “fundamental change of
circumstances” may justify the termination, withdrawal, or suspension
of the treaty when “the existence of those circumstances constituted an
essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty”
and “the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of
obligations” — e.g. a host state might claim an essential necessity to
privilege primarily for domestic investors due to a severe national
economic situation. 59
The following sections of this Article are devoted specifically to the
state of necessity defense, which has already been invoked by host states
to justify breach of international investment obligations due to national
economic and financial crises. 60 Then, this Article will investigate
whether and to what extent such defense can be relied on as a

56.

See generally Federica Paddeu & Kate Parlett, COVID-19 and Investment
Treaty
Claims,
KLUWER
ARB. BLOG
(Mar.
30,
2020),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/03/30/covid-19-andinvestment-treaty-claims [https://perma.cc/MZ5W-5DXX].

57.

See generally Alex Martinez, Invoking States Defences in Investment
Treaty Arbitration, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010).

58.

G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 23 (Jan. 28, 2002); see also JAMES CRAWFORD,
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY (2002) [hereinafter ILC COMMENTARY]; see also William
Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of NonPrecluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA.
J. INT’L L., 307–410 (2008).

59.

See Hermann Ferré & Kabir Duggal, The World Economic Crisis as a
Changed Circumstance, 43 COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES (Aug. 1,
2011); Lénárd, supra note 12.

60.

See generally Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 58.
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justification for the breach of obligations towards foreign investors
during the Pandemic.

III. State of necessity as a justification for the host
state in investment claims
As mentioned, international investment law offers a number of
instruments to host states to relieve their international responsibilities,
towards foreign investors, when facing exceptional circumstances.61
Most IIAs already include provisions that provide host states with
different lines of defense in investment claims brought by foreign
investors, such as non-precluded measure clauses, which allow states to
adopt measures to protect public objectives. 62
When such clauses are not expressly included in IIAs though , states
may turn to customary international law defenses, like the state of
necessity, codified in the ILC Articles as one of the “circumstances
precluding wrongfulness.” 63
The necessity defense was Argentina’s core defense in a set of
investment claims it faced against U.S. investors following the country’s
2001-2002 financial and economic crisis. 64
The proceeding Sections illustrate how the ILC Articles codified the
customary defense of necessity and how the defense has been applied
by investment arbitral tribunals; this preliminary overview is necessary
to understand what circumstances the Pandemic can successfully justify
the invocation of the necessity defense by host states in investment
claims.
A. The requirements of the necessity defense under customary
international law, as codified in article 25 of the ILC Articles and applied
so far by investment arbitral tribunals

Under general international law, the concept of necessity has been
subject to an evolving interpretation. However, it was finally codified
in Chapter V of the 2001 ILC Articles as one of the circumstances
precluding wrongfulness. 65 According to Article 25—which has come to
be considered as reflecting customary international law on necessity—

61.

Id.

62.

Michael Ostrove et al., State Defences to Investment Claims Arising From
COVID-19, DLA PIPER GLOBAL LAW FIRM (Apr. 29, 2020),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/morocco/insights/publications/2020/04/s
tate-defences-to-investment-claims-arising-from-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/783R-S4BD].

63.

Id.

64.

Id.

65.

See id.; see also ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 58, at ch. V.
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a State may not invoke necessity as a ground for precluding the
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international
obligation, unless the act is the only way for the State to safeguard an
essential interest against a grave and imminent peril and the act does
not seriously impair the essential interest of another states of the
international community. 67 Additionally, a state cannot invoke the
defense if it has contributed to the situation of necessity. 68
The cumulative conditions that must be met by a state to be able
to successfully invoke this defense, according to Article 25 of the ILC
Articles, are the following:
66

(1) The act in question must be the only way for the State to
safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril.69
The plea of necessity is excluded if there are other lawful means
available to protect the “essential interest” at stake, even if they are
more costly or less convenient. 70 The “only way” requirement has been
interpreted by international practice in a very strict way. For example,
the International Court of Justice, in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, found that
Hungary had other means than suspending and abandoning works
under the 1977 treaty with Czechoslovakia, even though these other
means would have involved “a more costly technique”. 71 Regarding the
meaning of “essential interests”, the 2001 ILC Commentary specifies
that “necessity consists not in danger to the lives of individuals in the
charge of a State official but in a grave danger either to the essential
interests of the State or the internationally community as a whole”. 72
Here, the question of defining whether an interest is “essential” is very

66.

See Ostrove et al., supra note 62.

67.

Id.

68.

See ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 58, at art. 25 (“1. Necessity may not
be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an
act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless
the act: (a) is the only means for the State to safeguard an essential
interest against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) does not seriously
impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which an
obligation exists, or the international community as a whole. 2. in any
case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding
wrongfulness if: (a) the international obligation in question excludes the
possibility of invoking necessity; or (b) the State has contributed to the
situation of necessity”).

69.

Ostrove et al., supra note 62.

70.

Id.

71.

Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J.
Rep. 7, ¶ 55 (Sept. 25) [hereinafter Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros].

72.

See ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 58, ¶ 2.
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fact specific. 73 Furthermore, according to Article 25, the state’s
“essential interest” should be threatened by a “grave and imminent
peril”. 74 In Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, the International Court of Justice
observed that the “imminence” requirement has to be interpreted as
“immediacy” or “proximity”, and not as a merely “possibility” of the
peril. 75
(2) The State’s act must not seriously impair an essential interest
of another State or of the international community as a whole. 76 In
particular, a plea of necessity is valid if the “the interest relied on […]
outweigh[s] all other considerations”. 77
(3) The State cannot invoke necessity if it has contributed to the
situation of necessity. 78 In its 2001 Commentary, the ILC emphasized
that “the contribution to the situation of necessity must be sufficiently
substantial and not merely incidental or peripheral.” 79 This view was
also endorsed by the International Court of Justice in GabcikovoNagymaros, when it stated Hungary could not invoke the necessity
defense since “it had helped, by act or omission to bring it about”. 80
Finally, if a situation of necessity is found, it should be assessed in
the period during which it was applicable. 81 As stated in Article 27 of
the ILC Articles, “the invocation of a circumstance precluding
wrongfulness . . . is without prejudice to: (a) compliance with the
obligation in question, if and to the extent that the circumstance
precluding wrongfulness no longer exists.” 82 Accordingly, as soon as the
situation of “grave and imminent peril” ceases, the State’s conduct is
not justified by necessity and is unlawful under international law. 83

73.

LG&E Energy Corp. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 251 (July 25, 2007).

74.

G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 58, at art. 25(1).

75.

Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, supra note 71, ¶¶ 42, 54.

76.

G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 58, at art. 25(1)(b).

77.

ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 58, ¶ 17.

78.

G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 58, at art. 25(2).

79.

ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 58, ¶ 20.

80.

Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J.
Rep 7, ¶ 57 (Sept. 25).

81.

Id. ¶ 54.

82.

G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 58, at art. 27(a).

83.

See generally LG&E Energy Corp. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, (July 25, 2007).
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Once assessed the existence of the state of necessity, Article 27 of
the ILC Articles further establishes the possibility of compensation for
any material loss caused by the measures adopted. 84 However, the ILC
Articles are not specific about the modalities of compensations; some
tribunals, such as the one in LG&E v. Argentina, “decided that the
damages suffered during the state of necessity should be borne by the
investor,” 85 while others, such as that in BG v. Argentina, 86 decided
that, even if a situation of necessity is established, states have an
obligation to compensate investors for damages occurred during the
period of necessity. 87
As mentioned above, more than 40 cases were brought against
Argentina in the early 2000s regarding international investment law.88
Claimants (mostly U.S. private investors) alleged that the Argentine
Government’s regulatory measures adopted to cope with the financial
crisis that hit the country in 2001 had breached a number of BITs
obligations. 89
In most of the cases, Argentina invoked the necessity defense to
justify the alleged violations of applicable BITs, relying on both the
emergency clause included in Article XI of the applicable 1991 USArgentina BIT 90 and on the customary rule of necessity. 91 Investment
arbitral tribunals, which had to deal with such pleas in the Argentinean
cases, recognized the possibility to invoke such a justification in case of
financial and economic crises. 92 However, they did not deal with the
84.

G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 58, at art. 27(b).

85.

LG&E Energy Corp. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 264 (July 25, 2007).

86.

BG Group Plc. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL case, Final Award, ¶
382 (Dec. 24, 2007).

87.

Id. ¶ 409.

88.

William W. Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability
under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 3 ASIAN J. WTO
& INT’L HEALTH L & POL’Y 199, 204 (2008).

89.

BG Group Plc. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL case, Final Award, ¶
86(b) (Dec. 24, 2007).

90.

Burke-White, supra note 88, at 205; see generally Treaty Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Arg.–U.S., art.
XI, Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124 (1992) [hereinafter Arg.–U.S. BIT]
(stating “this Treaty shall not preclude the application . . . of measures
necessary for . . . the Protection of [a Party’s] own essential security
interests” and invoked in the majority of Argentina’s investment
arbitration cases).

91.

Burke-White, supra note 88, at 205.

92.

Avidan Kent & Alexandra R. Harrington, The Plea of Necessity under
Customary International Law: A Critical Review in Light of the Argentine
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necessity defense in the same way, resulting in inconsistent decisions.93
Since the treaty-based emergency clause included in Article XI of the
U.S.-Argentina BIT refers to a situation of “emergency,” which is
similar to the concept of “necessity,” 94 as it has frequently been
interpreted and applied by arbitral tribunals through reliance on Article
25 of the ILC Articles. 95 This approach—and generally the relationship
between treaty-based emergency clauses and the customary rule of
necessity defense—was subject to judicial and scholarly debate, 96 which
goes expands beyond this article’s scope. What concerns this article is
how the customary rule of necessity defense has been interpreted and
applied in the context of international investment arbitration so far (in
particular the “pre-Pandemic” period).
In almost all of the previously mentioned cases, Argentina argued
that the gravity of the crisis affecting the country threatened the very
existence of the State 97 and the need to face the situation had led to
the adoption of the national measures that allegedly impaired U.S.
foreign investors. 98 As for the application of the necessity defense under
customary international law (as codified in Article 25 of the ILC
Articles), 99 according to Argentina, the measures adopted were the
“only means” to safeguard an essential interest against a “grave and

Cases, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW
246, 247 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles, eds., 2011).

AND

ARBITRATION

93.

Id.

94.

Compare Arg.–U.S. BIT, supra note 90, at Art. IV(3) (referring to war or
other armed conflict, revolution, state of national emergency, insurrection,
civil disturbance or other similar events) with G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note
58, at art. 25(1)(a) (treating necessity as the only way for the State to
safeguard essential interests against grave and imminent peril).

95.

Robert M. Ziff, The Sovereign Debtor’s Prison: Analysis of the Argentine
Crisis Arbitrations and the Implications for Investment Treaty Law, 10
RICH J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 345, 366–68 (2011).

96.

See, e.g., Christina Binder, Changed Circumstances in Investment Law:
Interfaces between the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility
with a Special Focus on the Argentine Crisis, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 608–630 (Christina Binder et
al. eds., 2009) (examining the relationship between treaty-based
emergency clauses and the rule of necessity in customary international
law).

97.

See Enron Corp et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
Award, ¶ 289 (May 22, 2007); see also Sempra Energy International v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 326 (Sept.
28, 2007).

98.

See Enron Corp et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
Award, ¶ 290 (May 22, 2007).

99.

ILC Commentary, supra note 58, at Art. 25.
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imminent peril.” 100 Moreover, Argentina maintained it did not
contributed to the situation of necessity, since most of the intervening
factors were exogenous. 101
Claimants (private investors), instead, generally maintained that
Argentina could not rely on the necessity defense under customary
international law. 102 According to the claimants, the Argentine crisis
had its origins in endogenous factors and resulted from Argentina’s own
policy failures (particularly, from the failure to implement its structural
reforms in the 1990s and to ensure open foreign trade and the
maintenance of the currency board’s credibility). 103 Moreover, the
economic crisis could not fall within the concept of “essential
interests,” 104 which should be “limited to war, natural disaster and other
situations threatening the existence of the State.” 105
Most arbitral tribunals stated that Argentina somehow contributed
to the situation of economic emergency because of bad decisions taken
at the governmental level. 106 Accordingly, the arbitrators did not agree
that Argentina could claim a state of emergency. 107 However, most of
the arbitral decisions agreed that in principle a grave economic crisis,
likely to undermine the social structure of a state, might amount to a
situation of necessity. 108 Most notable, arbitral tribunals in CMS,109
100. Enron Corp et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
Award, ¶ 295 (May 22, 2007); Sempra Energy International v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 334 (Sept. 28, 2007).
101. See Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 342 (Sept. 28, 2007) (referencing the First Expert
Report of Professor Nouriel Roubini of July 13, 2005). See also Enron
Corp et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶
297 (May 22, 2007) (referencing the Expert Opinion of Nouriel Roubini
of February 24, 2005).
102. See, e.g., Enron Corp et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 299 (May 22, 2007).
103. Id. ¶ 301 (referencing the Expert Opinion of Professor Sebastián Edwards
of April 27, 2005); see also Sempra Energy International v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 341 (Sept. 28, 2007)
(referencing the Expert Report of Professor Sebastián Edwards of
September 13, 2005).
104. Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 170 (Sept. 5, 2008).
105. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 340 (May 12, 2005) 11 ICSID Rep. 237 (2007).
106. Kent & Harrington, supra note 92, at 259.
107. Id.
108. Lénárd, supra note 12.
109. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 217 (May 12, 2005) 11 ICSID Rep. 237 (2007).
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Enron, 110 Sempra, 111 Suez / Vivendi and AWG, 112 Suez / InterAgua,113
Impregilo, 114 Total,115 and BG 116 concluded that Argentina could not
rely on the necessity defense as codified in Article 25 of the ILC Articles
in the given situations. 117
In particular, the CMS tribunal—which decided one of the very
first cases to be quoted by most of the following arbitral tribunals in
their decisions—asserted that the need to avoid a major crisis, with all
the social and political consequences that it implied, might constitute
an “essential interest of the State.” 118According to the tribunal, the
“crisis was indeed severe” 119 enough to justify the actions of the
government to prevent an escalation and risk the total collapse of the
economy. 120 However, the tribunal did not consider that the crisis was
of such gravity to justify an invocation of the necessity defense.121
Nevertheless, the tribunal took note of the gravity of the economic

110. Enron Corp et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
Award, ¶ 293 (May 22, 2007).
111. Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 346 (Sept. 28, 2007); see also Marie Christine
Hoelck Thjoernelund, State of Necessity as an Exception from State
Responsibility for Investments, 13 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 423, 466–
474 (2009) (discussing the arbitral court’s decision not to find necessity);
Federica Cristani, The Sempra Annulment Decision of 29 June 2010 and
Subsequent Developments in Investment Arbitration Dealing with the
Necessity Defence, 15 INT’L COMM. L. REV. 237 (2013) (tracing the
development of the necessity defense after the Sempra case).
112. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA and Vivendi Universal
SA v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19; AWG Group v.
Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Decision on Liability (July 30,
2010).
113. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA and InterAgua
Servicios Integrales del Agua SA v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability (July 30, 2010).
114. Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17,
Award, ¶ 359 (June 21, 2011).
115. Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision
on Liability, ¶ 485 (Dec. 27, 2010).
116. BG Group Plc. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL case, Final Award, ¶
381 (Dec. 24, 2007).
117. See Binder, supra note 96.
118. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 93 (May 12, 2005) 11 ICSID Rep. 237 (2007).
119. Id. ¶ 320.
120. Id. ¶ 356.
121. Id. ¶ 322.
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situation in Argentina when determining the amount of compensation
due to the claimants. 122
As for the “only way” requirement, laid down in Article 25 of the
ILC Articles, 123 the tribunal took note that the positions of the parties
and of the economists diverged on the point. 124 Indeed, while Argentina
supported that the measures adopted were the “only ones” available,
the claimant argued that alternatives were available to Argentina (but
it did not specify which measures Argentina could have adopted).125
The tribunal agreed with the claimants, finding that “which of these
policy alternatives would have been better is a decision beyond the
scope of the Tribunal’s task, which is to establish there was only one
way or various ways and thus whether the requirements for the
preclusion of wrongfulness have or have not been met.” 126 According to
the tribunal, Argentina had other means available to deal with the crisis
(but it did not refer to specific means that could be available) and,
therefore, did not meet the requirements imposed by Article 25 of the
ILC Articles. 127 Finally, the tribunal concluded that Argentina’s
contribution to the crisis was “sufficiently substantial and not merely
incidental or peripheral.” 128
In this respect, the difficulty in bringing policy-relevant issues to
judicial evaluation should be highlighted. 129 Some States have indeed
argued the existence of a general principle under international law,
according to which disputes involving political questions are exempted
from review by international courts and tribunals. 130 However, there are
some factors that are worth mentioning in this respect. First, states
have often brought cases involving national security issues in
international for a. 131 Moreover, international tribunals, including the
122. Id. ¶ 356.
123. G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 25 (Jan. 28, 2002).
124. See Thjoernelund, supra note 111, at 446.
125. Id.
126. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 323 (May 12, 2005) 11 ICSID Rep. 237 (2007).
127. Id. ¶ 324.
128. Id. ¶ 329, at 95–96; Thjoernelund, supra note 111, at 448.
129. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 90, (1933).

OF

LAW

IN

THE

130. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 178 (June 27); see also Ian
Brownlie, The Justiciability of Disputes and Issues in International
Relations, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 123 (1967); William W. Thayer,
International Arbitration of Justiciable Disputes, 26 HARV. L. REV. 416
(1912–1913).
131. See Burke-White & Von Staden, supra note 58, at 377.
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International Court of Justice, the European Court of Justice, the
European Court of Human Rights as well as several arbitral tribunals,
have regularly decided cases concerning national security matters.132
Also investment arbitral tribunals, although established to deal
specifically with “merely” investment disputes, have faced questions of
a quasi-constitutional nature, such as the legally permissible responses
to a massive economic collapse or the definition of public morality.133
In particular, these tribunalsdealt with regulatory acts of host states,
as in the case of Argentina, which enacted domestic measures to
overcome a national financial and economic crisis. 134 Measures of this
kind can be considered an expression of the public’s concern of the State
in financial and economic matters, since these matters are aimed at the
economic and financial stability of the State itself. 135
As a general rule, the legitimate exercise of regulatory powers,
aimed at protecting the environment, health and other welfare interests
of society, requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers,
among other variables, the economic impact, the degree of interference
with the investor’s reasonable expectations, and the character of the
governmental action. 136 Consequently, the issue still largely depends on
the consideration of arbitral tribunals. 137
The arbitral tribunal in the Suez case has perhaps endorsed the
most well-reasoned analysis of regulatory measures taken during a
financial and economic crisis. Here, the arbitral tribunal recognized that
Argentina, in enacting measures aimed at coping the financial and
economic crisis, has exercised its police powers. 138 Consequently, it
found that no unlawful expropriation had occurred because of such
measures. 139 Indeed, the tribunal stated that:
In evaluating a claim of expropriation it is important to recognize
a State’s legitimate right to regulate and to exercise its police
132. See Richard B. Bilder, Judicial Procedures Relating to the Use of Force,
31 VIRGINIA J. INT’L. L. 242, 269 (1991).
133. See Burke-White & Von Staden, supra note 58, at 372.
134. See AWG Group v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Decision on
Liability (July 30, 2010).
135. Federica Cristani, From Silence to Equitable Compensation: ‘Valuing’
Financial and Economic Crises in Investment Arbitration 1, 23 (Pázmány
Law Working Papers Nr. 2016/3 2016).
136. Id. at 24.
137. Paolo Bertoli et al., Regulatory Measures, Standards of Treatment and
the Law Applicable to Investment Disputes, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, INT’L
LAW AND COMMON CONCERNS 26, 33 (Tullio Treves et al. eds., 2014)
138. AWG Group v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Decision on
Liability, ¶¶ 139–40 (July 30, 2010).
139. Id. ¶ 140, at 52.
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power in the interests of public welfare and not to confuse
measures of that nature with expropriation. […] In analyzing the
measures taken by Argentina to cope with the crisis, the tribunal
finds that, given the nature of the severe crisis facing the country,
those general measures were within the general police powers of
the Argentine State, and they did not constitute a permanent and
substantial deprivation of the Claimants’ investments. […] The
Tribunal therefore concludes that such measures did not violate
the above quoted BIT articles with respect to direct or indirect
expropriation. 140

However, as the tribunal clearly pointed out, “that is not to say
that they have not violated other treaty commitments.” 141 The tribunal
found that the same measure, while not constituting unlawful
expropriation of the rights of foreign investors, did nevertheless breach
the fair and equitable standard, as included in a provision of the
applicable BIT. 142 In this respect, the tribunal did “balance the
legitimate and reasonable expectations of the Claimants with
Argentina’s right to regulate the provision of a vital public service,”143
concluding that, “when faced with the crisis, Argentina . . . enacted
various measures . . . Such actions were outside the scope of its
legitimate right to regulate and in effect constituted an abuse of
regulatory discretion”. 144
A few months after the Suez decision, the arbitral tribunal in Total
summarized the criteria to be followed when assessing the impact of
regulatory measures taken during a financial and economic crisis:
The host-State’s right to regulate domestic matters in the public
interest . . . requires . . . a weighing of the Claimant’s reasonable
and legitimate expectations on the one hand and the
Respondent’s legitimate regulatory interest on the other. Thus .
. .[t]he context of the evolution of the host economy, the
reasonableness of the normative changes challenged and their
appropriateness in the light of a criterion of proportionality . . .
have to be taken into account. 145

Consequently, the balance between the state’s regulatory powers
and the investor’s expectations must be assessed on a case-by-case
140. Id. ¶¶ 139–140, at 52.
141. Id. ¶ 140, at 52.
142. Id. ¶ 245, at 95.
143. Id. ¶ 236, at 91.
144. Id. ¶ 237, at 92.
145. Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision
on Liability, ¶ 123 (Dec. 27, 2010).
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basis, taking into consideration all the relevant circumstances.146
Looking at investment case law, one may observe a quite recent
tendency to apply the proportionality test to balance the different
interests involved.
In Suez the arbitral tribunal denied Argentina’s claim of the
necessity defense. 147 However, the case differs from the others involving
Argentina because the necessity defense was raised to claim that the
alleged unlawful measures were necessary to comply with human rights
obligations, i.e. the obligation to afford rights to water to its
population. 148 Under such circumstances, “[the tribunal] must balance
the legitimate and reasonable expectations of the Claimants with
Argentina’s right to regulate the provision of a vital public service.”149
Nonetheless it concluded that the measures adopted by Argentina did
breach the fair and equitable obligation towards foreign investors. 150
In Saur, similar to Suez, the tribunal affirmed that it had account
for “human rights in general and the right to water in particular”
insofar as they belong to the general principles of international law.151
However, such a finding was of no particular help for Argentina.152
As has been affirmed, notwithstanding some attempts by arbitral
tribunals to balance all the interests at stake, “the impact of human
rights considerations on the decision by [investment] tribunals remains
a matter for speculation.” 153
One last note should be made on how an emergency situation may
affect the question of compensation. In the Argentine investment
arbitration cases, the situation of emergency, even though it did not
justify the successful invocation of the necessity defense under
customary international law, was nevertheless taken into account by
arbitrators in the determination of the amount of the “equitable”
146. Bertoli et al., supra note 137, at 36.
147. Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision
on Liability, ¶ 345 (Dec. 27, 2010).
148. Attila Tanzi, On Balancing Foreign Investment Interests with Public
Interests in Recent Arbitration Case Law in the Public Utilities Sector,
11 THE LAW & PRAC. OF INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 47, 57 (2012).
149. AWG Group v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Decision on
Liability, ¶ 345, at 91 (July 30, 2010).
150. See Cristani, supra note 135.
151. Saur International SA v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/4, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 330 (June 6, 2012).
152. See generally AWG Group v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Case,
Decision on Liability (July 30, 2010).
153. Attila Tanzi, Public Interest Concerns in International Investment
Arbitration in the Water Service Sector. Problems and Prospects for an
Integrated Approach, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND COMMON CONCERNS 318, 323 (Tullio Treves et al. eds., 2014).
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compensation due. 154 For example, in CMS, the tribunal decided to take
into account the “magnitude of the crisis faced by Argentina in
determining the amount of compensation due to the claimant; 155 in
Sempra, the tribunal took into account the crisis conditions affecting
Argentina when determining the compensation due for the liability
found in connection with the breach of the Treaty standards; 156 and in
National Grid, the tribunal took into account the economic crisis when
determining the quantum of compensation due. 157
In the framework of investment arbitration, therefore, a uniform
and conclusive interpretation and application of the necessity defense
has not yet been reached. Indeed, when dealing with the customary rule
of necessity, a State is faced with the difficulty to meet the stringent
requirements imposed by Article 25 of the ILC Articles. 158 To date, no
arbitral tribunal (at least in the investment arbitration context) has
successfully upheld a state’s necessity defense under customary
international law. 159
However, the reasonings of the arbitral tribunals reviewed in this
Article can be useful in determining how the Pandemic can be invoked
by host states to justify alleged breaches of international obligations
towards foreign investors.
B. Applying the customary law rule of the necessity defense during the
pandemic

As mentioned, during the Pandemic, states around the world
adopted regulatory measures to contain and mitigate the spread of the
Pandemic. 160 These measures affect foreign investors. 161 This adoption
could trigger investor-state arbitrations, with foreign investors claiming
the breach of international investment obligations by host states.

154. See Cristani, supra note 135, at 21–22.
155. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶¶ 356, 444–55, at 103, 129–33 (May 12, 2005) 11
ICSID Rep. 237 (2007).
156. Sempra case, note 98, ¶ 397, at 117.
157. National Grid P.L.C. v. Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL case, Award
¶ 274 (Nov. 3, 2008). See also Cristani, supra note 135.
158. See Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1,
Decision on Liability, ¶ 345 (Dec. 27, 2010).
159. See e.g., AWG Group v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Decision
on Liability ¶¶ 260–65 (July 30, 2010).
160. See Ostrove et al., supra note 62.
161. See Paddeu & Parlett, supra note 56.
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Some BITs already include public health exceptions or, more
generally, allow for the exercise of police powers, which can be invoked
by host states to justify measures adopted during the Pandemic. 162
Moreover, host states might invoke the customary rule of the
necessity defense. As mentioned, to successfully invoke a necessity
defense, a state shall meet the following requirements: (1) there must
be a grave and imminent peril; which (2) must threaten an essential
interest; (3) the act must not seriously impair the essential interest of
another states of the international community as a whole; and (4) it
should be the only way to safeguard the interest of the state. 163 A state
cannot invoke the defense if it contributed to the situation of
necessity. 164
The outbreak of the Pandemic could be understood as being a
“grave and imminent peril” for a state, taken also into account the
global scale of the phenomenon, 165 which constitutes an imminent
threat and harm to the public health and well-being of the population
in each state. 166
Furthermore, the WHO decision to classify the Pandemic as a
Public Health Emergency of International Concern, coupled with the
declaration of emergencies in several EUC states and the consequent
emergency measures that have been adopted to contain the spread of
the Pandemic make it quite apparent that it threatens an essential
interest of the state (and the international community). 167 Notably, the
well-being of a states’ population has already been considered an
“essential interest” by investment arbitral tribunal. 168 For example, in
National Grid, the arbitral tribunal affirmed that “the actions of the
162. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Australia
and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (entered into force
Dec. 20, 2015). See also Federica Paddeu et al., Italian Branch of the
International Law Association (ILA), Litigating COVID-19 under
(May
27,
2020),
International
Law,
YOUTUBE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RaQmSImsqWY
[https://perma.cc/C8NZ-RZ26]; Paddeu & Parlett, supra note 57;
Bekker, supra note 46.
163. See Paddeu & Parlett, supra note 56.
164. See Federica Paddeu & Freya Jephcott, COVID-19 and Defences in the
Law of State Responsibility: Part II, EJIL: TALK! BLOG (March 17,
2020),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/covid-19-and-defences-in-the-law-ofstate-responsibility-part-ii [[https://perma.cc/TD2H-YNMG].
165. See Ostrove et al., supra note 62.
166. Paddeu & Jephcott, supra note 164; Paddeu & Parlett, supra note 56;
The COVID-19 Pandemic and Investment Arbitration, ACERIS LAW
(Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.acerislaw.com/the-covid-19-pandemic-andinvestment-arbitration [https://perma.cc/D7JG-V2CR].
167. Paddeu & Jephcott, supra note 164.
168. See Paddeu & Parlett, supra note 56.
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[state] had as an objective the protection of social stability and the
maintenance of essential services vital to the health and welfare of the
population, an objective which is recognized in the framework of the
international law of human rights”. 169 In Suez, the tribunal recognized
that “[t]he provision of water and sewage services . . . was vital to the
health and well-being of . . . [the] people and was therefore an essential
interest of the . . . State”. 170
On the other hand, demonstrating that the measures adopted are
“the only way” to safeguard the essential interest against the grave and
imminent peril might be quite challenging. For example in Enron, the
tribunal stated, “there are always many approaches to address and
correct . . . critical events.” 171 And indeed, EU states did not adopt
uniform approaches to contain the Pandemic in their own territory. 172
As to the requirement that the measures must not seriously impair
an essential interest of another state or of the international community
as a whole, arbitral tribunals have been consistent in assessing the wellbeing of a state’s population as superior to the interests of foreign
investors. 173
Instead, one problematic aspect might be non-contribution by the
state invoking the necessity defense, 174 which, in the words of the ILC,
must be “sufficiently substantial and not merely incidental or
peripheral.” 175 While some arbitral tribunals interpreted such
requirement in a restrictive way, as in Impregilo, according to which “a
State’s contribution to its necessity situation need not be specifically
intended or planned—it can be the consequence, inter alia, of wellintended but ill-conceived policies,” 176 others considered that a certain
degree of fault should be assessed, as stated by the tribunal in Urbaser
that “it should be shown that the Government’s acts were . . . at least
of such a nature that the Government must have known that such crisis
169. National Grid P.L.C. v. Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL case, Award
¶ 245 (Nov. 3, 2008).
170. AWG Group v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Decision on
Liability ¶ 260–65 (July 30, 2010)
171. Enron Corp et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
Award, ¶ 308 (May 22, 2007); see also CMS Gas Transmission Company
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 323 (May
12, 2005) 11 ICSID Rep. 237 (2007). For a comment, see Paddeu, supra
note 164 and Paddeu & Parlett, supra note 56.
172. See Paddeu & Jephcott, supra note 164.
173. See id.; Paddeu & Parlett, supra note 56.
174. See Paddeu & Jephcott, supra note 164.
175. See id.
176. Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17,
Award, ¶ 356 (June 21, 2011).
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and emergency must have been the outcome of its economic and
financial policy.” 177
Actually, the assessment of non-contribution by a state would need
to be considered on a case-by-case basis. While the virus outbreak
might be considered something that states could not foresee, the
consequences of the measures adopted to monitor and contain the
Pandemic could be understood as being envisaged by the states
themselves. 178 Accordingly, tribunals might determine that the states
contributed to the crisis, to the extent that they could foresee the
economic and social consequences of the anti-COVID-19 measures
adopted.
Finally, if a situation of necessity is found, the period during which
it was applicable needs to also be assessed. In this respect, an arbitral
tribunal will also have to consider the exact starting and ending dates
of the emergency situation. 179
Overall, there will be several challenges for states to rely on the
customary rule of necessity with regard to the anti-COVID-19
measures. 180 However, given the exceptional character of the Pandemic,
a more flexible approach in applying the necessity defense requirements
may be needed. 181 It will be interesting to see how investment arbitral
tribunal will address these questions.
Finally, in recent years, a number of states have invoked the police
powers doctrine as a defense in investment claims involving the
assessment of the implementation of regulatory measures 182 aimed at
protecting public health. The Philip Morris case is quite telling in this
respect. 183 In Phillip Morris, the arbitral tribunal concluded that the
decision of the state to require a plain packaging for tobacco products
was adopted in the exercise of the state’s police power with the aim to
protect public health. 184 The tribunal reasoned that “[p]rotecting public
health has since long been recognized as an essential manifestation of
177. Urbaser S.A. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26,
Award, ¶ 711 (Dec. 8, 2016).
178. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 328 (May 12, 2005) 11 ICSID Rep. 237 (2007).
179. On the difficulties in assessing a ‘final’ date for the emergency situation
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, see Federica Paddeu & Michael
Waibel, The Final Act: Exploring the End of Pandemics, 114 AM. J. INT’L
L. 698, 698 (forthcoming 2020).
180. See Paddeu & Parlett, supra note 56; Paddeu & Jephcott, supra note 166.
181. Paddeu & Jephcott, supra note 166.
182. Ostrove et al., supra note 62.
183. Philip Morris Brands Sàrl. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay. ICSID Case
No. ARB/10/7, Award ¶ 197 (July 8, 2016).
184. Id. ¶ 307.
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the State’s police power;” 185 accordingly, “the Challenged Measures
were a valid exercise by Uruguay of its police powers for the protection
of public health,” 186 reaffirming that,
The responsibility for public health measures rests with the
government and investment tribunals should pay great deference
to governmental judgments of national needs in matters such as
the protection of public health. In such cases respect is due to the
‘discretionary exercise of sovereign power, not made irrationally
and not exercised in bad faith’ . . . [and] ‘[t]he sole inquiry for the
Tribunal . . . is whether or not there was a manifest lack of
reasons for the legislation. 187

The arbitral tribunal in that case also recalled the award rendered
in 1903 by the Germany-Venezuela Claims Commission in the Bischoff
case, according to which “[c]ertainly during an epidemic of an infectious
disease there can be no liability for the reasonable exercise of police
powers.” 188 Other investment tribunals, like in Chemtura 189 and
Apotex 190, confirmed this approach. 191
On this issue, it can be also briefly mentioned that the recent EUSingapore Investment Protection Agreement restates the Parties’ “right
to regulate . . . to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the
protection of public health . . . . “ and provides that “the mere fact
that a Party regulates . . . in a manner which negatively affects an
investment or interferes with an investor’s expectations, including its
expectations of profits, does not amount to a breach of an obligation”
under the treaty. 192

185. Id. ¶ 291.
186. Id. ¶ 307.
187. Id. ¶ 399.
188. Germany – Venezuela Mixed Claims Commission, Bischoff Case, 10 RIAA
420 (1903); see also Ostrove et al., supra note 62.
189. Chemtura Corporation v. Government of Canada. UNCITRAL Case,
Award, ¶ 266 (Aug. 2, 2010).
190. Apotex Holdings Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/12/1, Award, ¶ 8.75 (Aug. 25, 2014).
191. Cleary Gottlieb Law Firm, COVID-19: Public Health Emergency
Measures and State Defenses in International Investment Law, ALERT
MEMORANDUM (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/newsand-insights/publication-listing/covid-19-public-health-emergencymeasures-and-state-defenses-in-international-investment-law
[https://perma.cc/TDY2-YNHD].
192. Investment Protection Agreement, EU–Sing., art. 2.2, Oct. 19, 2018, O.J.
L 279 1; for a comment, see Cleary Gottlieb Law Firm, supra note 191.
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Accordingly, states might find it more convenient to rely on the
police power doctrine when justifying the measures adopted during the
Pandemic before investment arbitral tribunals—especially, as already
mentioned, when it is already envisaged by the applicable IIA.

IV. Conclusion
International investment law and customary international law
provide a range of instruments that can be used during emergency
situations. These instruments are meant to be used as a justification
for states that choose not to comply with international obligations
because of a grave situation undermining national essential interests.193
Nevertheless, especially when it comes to the customary rule of the
necessity defense, investment arbitration case law is not very helpful,
since the defense has been subject to diverse interpretations. 194 In
responding to the Pandemic, several EU states have declared states of
national emergency or epidemiological emergencies and have adopted
anti-COVID-19 measures on such grounds. 195 In such cases, states may
seek to invoke the state of emergency when relying on an essential
security clause in the applicable IIA or under the customary law rule
of the necessity defense. 196
However, it should be noticed that emergency clauses in IIAs and
the customary rule of necessity have developed as temporary exceptions
and defenses, with stringent requirements for their application. 197 If the
state of emergency is likely to persist in the medium- or long-term,
maybe we should rethink how we want to reshape international
obligations of states towards foreign investors and the relevant
exceptions, allowing for a higher degree of flexibility in their application
by investment arbitral tribunals that will be asked to assess all the
circumstances at stake that have led to the adoption of national
measures affecting foreign investor’s rights. 198
193. See generally Paddeu & Parlett, supra note 56.
194. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶¶ 353–55 (May 12, 2005) 11 ICSID Rep. 237 (2007);
LG&E Energy Corp. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 229 (July 25, 2007); see also Cleary
Gottlieb Law Firm, supra note 191.
195. States of Emergency in Response to the Coronavirus Crisis: Situation in
Certain Member States III, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RSCH. SERV.
(June 2020),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/651972/E
PRS_BRI(2020)651972_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/9C26-3P44].
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